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ABSTRACT

Responses to Piagetian-type stories were gathered from seven Appalachian children ranging in age from 7-14 years. Their responses were examined in two ways: (1) individually, in order to see whether each child's sense of justice had evolved in accord with the age findings of Piaget; and (2) collectively, in order to determine similarities and differences among the children concerning beliefs about several justice-related issues. Data on individual concepts of justice pointed to significant delays in the development of two children. Both subjects were functioning at a level of conceptualizing about justice that was far below the age findings of Piaget. Examined collectively, the data on justice-related issues revealed that the subjects varied widely in their notions about the nature and purpose of punishment; that they held equality to be more important than authority but less important than obedience; that they relied heavily on authority figures to resolve conflicts between children; and that they universally rejected the concept of collective responsibility. In sum, the data revealed evidence for the existence of some delay in subjects' senses of justice, especially as regards the issues of authority and obedience; however, the evidence was felt to be insubstantial as regards attributing these delays entirely to the restrictive atmosphere of Appalachia. (Author/JMB)

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CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AMONG CHILDREN
IN AN APPALACHIAN COMMUNITY *

Carol Goodwin Taylor **

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ABSTRACT

This study examined concepts of justice among seven children in an Appalachian community. Previous research has shown that children's concepts of justice evolve in a developmental stage sequence and that cultural and societal differences exist in the rate at which the sequence develops. Appalachia was chosen as the location for the study based upon the presence there of a number of social and cultural variables that are thought to restrict the development of a mature sense of justice. Responses to Piagetian-type stories were gathered from seven Appalachian children and were examined in two ways: (1) individually, in order to see whether each child's sense of justice had evolved in accord with the age findings of Piaget; (2) collectively, in order to determine similarities and differences among the children concerning beliefs about several justice-related issues. Data on individual concepts of justice pointed to significant delays in the development of two children. Both subjects were functioning at a level of conceptualizing about justice that was far below the age findings of Piaget. Because the five other subjects revealed generally age-appropriate concepts by Piagetian standards, it cannot be said that as a group they had delayed sense of justice. Examined collectively, the data on justice-related issues revealed that the subjects varied widely in their notions about the nature and purpose of punishment; that they held equality to be more important than authority but less important than obedience; that they relied heavily on authority figures to resolve conflicts between children; and that they universally rejected the concept of collective responsibility. In sum, the data revealed evidence for the existence of some delay in subjects' senses of justice, especially as regards the issues of authority and obedience; however, the evidence was felt to be insubstantial as regards attributing these delays entirely to the restrictive atmosphere of Appalachia. Rather, there is good reason to believe that the cultural and social variables peculiar to Appalachia combined with family and individual idiosyncracies to influence the development of concepts of justice among these children.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During the last decade there has been a rapidly expanding awareness among many Americans of the important role the society plays in shaping the lives of its individual members. This realization has, no doubt, been brought to the level of consciousness for most of us by our repeated exposure, through the mass media, to the tragic inequities in the society's distribution of justice: e.g., war, poverty, racial and sexual discrimination, etc. These inequities pose some potentially serious contradictions between, on the one hand, the guiding priorities inherent in the concept of "democracy," and on the other, the actual operating priorities of our own democracy. Specifically, it is around this notion of "justice," the definition of its role in a democracy, and the emphasis it should be accorded, that there is enormous potential for contribution to an evolutionary or revolutionary new way of thinking about how a social system can best function to serve its members.

Historically, concern about the importance of justice for the individual as a requirement for the effective functioning of the system as a whole, has decreased significantly from the time when its incorporation into the Constitution and the Bill of Rights reflected belief in its indispensable and unparalleled value. What might account for this decline

in the import accorded to the notion of individual justice is the evolvment of a set of historical circumstances far too complex to explain in depth here, the combined influence of which has continued to permeate American moral thought and to determine its direction and emphasis.

It would serve no purpose to hypothesize about what might have happened if different historical conditions had prevailed to order our society's values. Instead, a more productive effort might be to examine and compare our own existing social order to a hypothetical system in which the concepts of "justice" and "societal responsibility" are accorded a different emphasis.

John Rawls, in his book, A Theory of Justice, points out that American thought historically has taken its own peculiar utilitarian approach to, or justification of, the existing social order, and that is, "that the social order ought to be an efficient instrument for maximizing welfare and happiness." Out of this line of thinking, Rawls elaborates, most Americans have been able to warrant or to excuse inequities in the distribution of justice and fairness in light of the fact that this disparity is counterbalanced by contribution to the general welfare. "Thus it is argued by conservatives in the U.S. that over-all economic growth has been worth its costs in inequality and injustices" (Rawls, 1972, p.26).

In attacking this view of the role of the society and the function of justice within that society, Rawls argues, instead, for a designed and invented moral order in which

inequalities in the circumstances of genetic heredity and social position are minimized. He says that such a system is both rational and moral, and he uses an intriguing paradigm to illustrate how he arrives at this position: he proposes that if one can imagine "a sensible and a reasonable man" who is ignorant of what his own particular situation would be in a social order (e.g., rich or poor, male or female, black or white, etc.), then one would have a sort of "Everyman" who is devoid of biases and self-interests, and whose choices should therefore have a general and representative character. Then, Rawls suggests, offer this man the opportunity to create a moral order in which he is to be a member and he will, Rawls hypothesizes, "choose a method of distribution of advantages and disadvantages that will be fair to all, and that can be agreed to be fair to all, whatever their position may be." In Rawls' social order the distribution of justice or fairness would be determined by two governing principles: first, that every member has an equal right to the most extensive equal liberties that are compatible with similar liberties for all; and secondly, that the existence of any inequality can be justified only insofar as it is an advantage to the least advantaged member.

The researcher's reasons for according Rawls' theory of justice so much consideration and importance are, essentially, the same reasons which determined the selection of a thesis topic. The basic underlying concern in Rawls' theory is with the inherent value of the individual. This emphasis, or bias,

led him to examine the larger society's responsibility to its individual members. From either a moral or a rational point of view, there would seem to be real merit in the decision to assume a posture of respect for the intrinsic worth of the individual. Adherence to this belief led the researcher to consider, as Rawls did, the importance of the relationship between man and his larger society. Personal thoughts about this relationship produced several almost unresearchable hypotheses: first, that each person's capacity to fully appreciate and find meaning in his own life is determined by the measure of dignity and worth he sees in himself; secondly, that these feelings are instilled through interactions with other individuals and through experiences with social institutions; and thirdly, that the better or the more "positive" these experiences and interactions are, the greater the likelihood that feelings of dignity and self-worth will develop.

As these hypotheses were examined more closely, it became clear to the researcher that they represented the philosophical groundwork for her interest in the concept of justice. From this groundwork evolved the following premise: just as the larger society reflects how much it values its individual members by the manner in which it distributes justice, so too, an individual will perceive his intrinsic value or personal worth to his society on the basis of his interactions with its various social institutions; that is, whether he can expect "just" or "unjust" treatment in dealings with those institutions.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Children's Concepts of Justice

Since this study will deal specifically with concepts of justice among children, gathering of the research already done in this area required tracing back to the early twentieth century. At that time, the social sciences had begun to deal seriously with the concept of morality. Both researchers and theorists had great hopes that through the study of the development of moral character and moral ideology we would have a key to understanding all aspects of social development. In examining the moral concepts of children, investigators have generally employed one of three approaches: (1) the use of behavioral measures of the child's actions in relation to societal rules of conduct, (2) the study of the child's emotional reactions to transgression, (3) the investigation of the child's cognitive awareness of cultural standards and the application of rules to situations of moral conflict (Irwin, 1971).

Many of those researchers who have employed the third approach, examination of the judgmental side of moral development, have eventually felt the need to extend their research to include children's concepts of justice. The theory which has provided the main impetus for research on concepts of justice has been that of psychologist Jean Piaget. Piaget

has focused on the cognitive processes underlying moral responses and has emphasized that these processes undergo certain developmental changes. His "stage" approach to understanding children's moral development involves analyzing the nature of the thought processes found in different age groups. Basically, Piaget believes that internal moral standards evolve out of a set of primitive attitudes and conceptions that are continuously transformed as the child interacts with his social world. Piaget emphasizes that moral stages cannot be explained in terms of the unfolding of biological or neurological structures, but, instead, that they reflect the cognitive growth that accompanies a child's continual interactions with others. This process of social participation, especially in the form of role-taking, is the fundamental factor responsible for the development of an internal moral order.

Many of Piaget's conclusions about the development of moral concepts resulted from his observations of children's behavior and beliefs concerning the rules for the game of marbles (Piaget, 1932). These observations led him to believe that both intellectual growth and the experiences of role-taking in the peer group naturally transform a child's perception of "rules" from external authoritarian commands to internal principles. Essentially Piaget saw this transformation as a reflection of the growth of logical principles of justice. In terms of the nature of their development, he explains, "In contrast to a given rule imposed upon the child

from the outside, the rule of justice is an immanent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium. The sense of justice is largely independent of adult precept and requires nothing more for its development than mutual respect and solidarity among children" (Piaget, 1932, p. 196). Piaget eventually acknowledged, however, that because of certain intellectual and social influences, there are individual children and defined groups of children whose concepts of justice may not appear at the same age levels defined in his stage theory.

Since most subsequent research on children's concepts of justice has been aimed at either supporting or refuting Piaget's theory, it would seem to be worthwhile to examine the cognitive processes which characterize each developmental stage. Piaget hypothesized the existence of three major periods in the development of the sense of justice in the child. During the first period, lasting up to the age of 7-8, a child's cognitive limitations lead him to confuse moral rules with physical laws. He isn't able to distinguish notions of just and unjust from his notions of duty and disobedience. Because of this he perceives any set of rules prescribed by an authority figure as being just, so long as the adult is consistent in maintaining those rules. In terms of his understanding of retributive justice, the child accepts every punishment as legitimate if it, too, is in accord with consistent rules. Because authority always takes precedence over justice, notions of equality and reciprocity are not fully understood or valued.

In terms of what Piaget called "immanent justice," children of this age group believe in an automatic justice meted out by inanimate objects and the forces of nature (animism).

The second period in a child's development of a sense of justice, contained approximately between ages 8-11, Piaget referred to as the stage of "progressive equalitarianism." By this time a child has lost much of his unquestioning respect for adult authority and begins to develop increasingly autonomous notions of justice morality. In terms of punishment, the child no longer passively accepts retributive justice and the principles of expiation and atonement. Instead, the only punishments which the child perceives to be truly legitimate are those based on reciprocity. At this age, too, the animistic type of thought that characterizes a belief in immanent justice is on the decline. A parallel process is the decreasing emphasis on reward and punishment, as moral action begins to acquire its own intrinsic value. In terms of retributive justice, regard for equality outweighs all other considerations. In relations among children, the most notable change is the significant growth of equalitarianism.

The third major period, beginning about age 11-12, is primarily characterized by equalitarian notions of justice being tempered by an appreciation of relativity. Because the child has become much less egocentric in character he is able to acknowledge the existence of more than one moral perspective, thus the child can now allow that both retributive and distributive justice must involve consideration of extenuating

circumstances involved in situations of moral conflict. Piaget believes that the child's passage into this third stage is the result of a kind of moral evolution, in which a logical and effectual sense of justice develops naturally out of the progressive cooperation and mutual respect necessary for social interactions. Importantly, Piaget emphasizes that . . . "authority as such cannot be the source of justice," but, instead that "the preponderant factor in the evolution of equalitarian justice" is cooperation founded on mutual respect. (Piaget, 1932, p.197)

After Piaget presented his theoretical foundation for understanding the moral development of children, a number of researchers undertook their own investigations to test the validity of his observations. Certainly the most notable and contributive of these researchers has been Lawrence Kohlberg. From the results of his studies on the developmental nature of moral judgment, Kohlberg postulated the existence of a set of six moral stages which fall into three major levels of development, as follows:

Level I. Premoral

Type 1. Punishment and obedience orientation

Type 2. Naive instrumental hedonism

Level II. Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity

Type 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval of others

Type 4. Authority maintaining morality

Level III. Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles

Type 5. Morality of contract, of individual rights, and of democratically accepted law

Type 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience

(Kohlberg, 1964)

In the initial study which led Kohlberg to postulate this model, children's responses to hypothetical moral conflicts revealed that more mature modes of thought (Types 4-6) increased from age 10-16, while less mature modes (Types 1-2) decreased with age. Data with regard to the sequence of these types supported Kohlberg's hypothesis that the attainment of each type of thought depends on the prior attainment of the next lower type. Therefore, he concluded, the sequence is invariant (Kohlberg, 1963).

In a subsequent study, Turiel obtained results that lent support to two of Kohlberg's developmental propositions: (1) that the stage sequence is invariant and, thus, more learning will result from exposure to the stage directly above one's level than from two stages further above; (2) that passage from one stage to the next involves integration of the previous stages, thus, more learning results from exposure to the stage directly above than to the stage directly below (Turiel, 1966). While neither Kohlberg nor Turiel dealt specifically with the development of the concept of justice in children, their research on the sequentiality and integration

of stages of moral development has provided a great body of closely related knowledge which may, eventually, contribute to a more complete understanding of the whole process of social development.

Among those researchers whose investigations were specifically aimed at casting more light on Piaget's hypotheses, most have interviewed latency-age, pre-adolescent, and adolescent children. One study, however, attempted to examine the extent to which children under the age of six possess mature notions of justice. Using two age levels of preschool children, the researchers discovered that both the younger preschoolers (median age 4 yrs. 3 mos.) and the older preschoolers (median age 5 yrs. 1 mo.) were more just than unjust in their responses; that the older Ss had a more mature understanding of justice than the younger Ss; and that all the Ss had a clearer understanding of guilt-innocence and apology-restitution than they did of intentionality (Irwin and Moore, 1971). All the findings are essentially in accord with those of Piaget.

One aspect of Piaget's developmental theory of justice has received more attention, in the form of research, than any other; that is, the influence of socio-economic and cultural conditions on the rate of development of concepts of justice. In Kohlberg's study using urban and suburban, middle- and lower-class boys aged 10, 13, and 16, he found no correlation between social class or home location and the level of morality characteristic of each age group (Kohlberg,

1963). One remarkably ambitious study, undertaken by J. L. Tapp, employed the interview method to examine children's concepts of law and order in seven different cultures (Denmark, Greece, Japan, India, Italy, U. S.--black and white). Subjects, ages 10-14, were divided by social class and sex. Results showed that neither the child's culture, his social class, nor his sex were critical variables. Essentially, all the children believed that the nature and function of rules and laws are the same. In all but one culture (India), children indicated that they wanted a just system based on consensus and equality, and that the violation of social laws and rules could be morally justified under certain circumstances (Tapp, 1970).

In another comparative study all Ss were lower socioeconomic American students, grades 2, 5, 8, and 11. Results confirmed two of Piaget's hypotheses: older children tended to show more concern for mitigating factors in situations depicting violations of justice, and (2) there was little correlation between concepts of justice and intelligence. On the other hand, two findings did not confirm Piaget: (1) oldest and youngest children tended to seek justice in an authority figure, and (2) older children who accepted reciprocity did not demand the "mathematical equivalent" of what was received (Durkin, 1959). What should be noted about Durkin's study is that she neglects to comment on whether or not her results might contradict Piaget's stage theory, or whether, instead, they might offer support to his findings

that the rate of development may be retarded due to certain social influences such as low socio-economic status (Piaget, 1932).

Concern over the rate at which concepts of justice develop under different social circumstances has led to a number of other cross-cultural studies. An enlightening study was done by P. H. Najarian-Svajian concerning the prevalence of the idea of immanent justice among Lebanese children and adults. He hypothesized that, in a culture like that of Lebanon, the combined factors of religious-moral teaching and child-rearing practices would reinforce the idea of immanent justice. In that particular Middle Eastern culture, he explains, adults often tell children who have undergone an accidental unpleasant experience that they have been punished by God, or simply that it was an event of destiny, independent of good or bad deeds. Data on the incidence of the idea of immanent justice in children below 8 years of age was comparable to Piaget's findings. However, while Piaget's group showed a decline in this type of thought beginning by age 9, the Lebanese children showed no diminution, suggesting that by this age cultural influence becomes an important factor in the development of mature notions of justice (Najarian-Svajian, 1966). The study also showed the Lebanese college students, aged 18-25, were clearly realistic in their thoughts about justice, while their illiterate counterparts still retained the idea of immanent justice. (Piaget called this phenomenon "moral realism" because it was characteristic

of the concrete thinking of young children.) Importantly, this second set of results suggests that perhaps culture cannot only retard the development of mature concepts of justice, but that culture may actually prevent that development from ever occurring.

Since Piaget has hypothesized that notions of immanent justice are characteristic only of the first major stage of moral development, there has naturally been some interest in studying cultures where those notions do not diminish with age. Two types of immanent justice, mysticism (belief in omnipotent god or gods) and fatalism were considered by Najarian-Svajian. Another type of immanent justice, animism, is the attributing of human motives to inanimate objects. In his study on animism among Hopi children, Dennis told subjects, ages 12-18, stories in which a child had an unpleasant experience with an inanimate object after having violated a social rule. The Hopi children responded with explanations that were highly animistic in nature (Dennis, 1943). Dennis attributed this tendency to the Hopi culture in which the naturalistic, the magical, and the supernatural are seldom separated.

The data which Dennis used for comparison with his Hopi subjects came from a quite similar study done by Lerner with lower- and middle-class white subjects. While the percentage of animistic answers among the youngest Hopi children (ages 12-13) was 64%, the percentage of animistic responses among the 10 and 11 year-olds in Lerner's Area A, an underprivileged

area, was 31%; in his high socio-economic area, Area B, it was only 15% (Lerner, 1937). Dennis' recording of 64% animistic responses among Hopi 12 and 13 year-olds was comparable to that of Lerner's 5 and 7 year-old middle-class subjects. Both sets of findings clearly highlight the importance of social class and culture for the rate of development of concepts of justice.

Another study of the effects of social atmosphere involved a comparison of moral judgments of two groups of mentally retarded girls, one group being institutionalized, the other living in homes. Among subjects living in the community, MA as well as socio-economic background was found to influence the frequency with which judgments of "moral realism" were made. Contrarily, in the institutionalized group, judgments of "moral realism" were universally high, regardless of MA (Abel, 1941). One probable explanation for "immature" notions of justice and punishment among institutionalized girls is the nature of the constraint area itself. Abel points out that in many institutions the attendants are overworked and under pressure to solve problems in the most expedient way, not necessarily the most just way. Therefore, he suggests, patients who have no real recourse to righting the wrongs done to them may simply have to adjust to injustice. The political implications of this study may be related to what Kohlberg said about children's notions of law and government; that they "are perceived quite differently by the child if he feels a sense of potential participation in the social order than if

he does not" (Kohlberg, 1964, p.386).

In an interesting study done with college students and Peace Corps volunteers, the subjects were assigned to a typology of moral reasoning according to their responses to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Scale. In general, the Ss assigned to the highest of the five levels on the typology were far more active in political-social matters, especially protest, than the Ss assigned to lower levels of moral reasoning (Haan, Smith, and Block, 1968). While the results of this study suggest a high correlation between political-social activity and sophisticated moral reasoning, history clearly indicates that the two factors don't always go hand-in-hand, (witness Adolph Hitler, internationally active in politics, yet primitive in moral reasoning). Still, the correlation may have significance, especially if it is examined in light of the data found in a study done by Richard Quinney. His subjects, residents of the Southern Appalachia region, were divided according to social class and religious fundamentalism. He found that Ss of low social status and high religious fundamentalism were, in general, politically alienated and fatalistic about life (Quinney, 1964). The measure of political alienation was determined by Ss responses to questions referring to the control of politics and the honesty of elections of county officials. Fatalism was measured by the extent to which Ss agreed or disagreed with statements such as: "Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself."

Quinney believes that the correlation between low social status and the presence of fatalism and political alienation could be explained by the fact that, because of their marginal positions in the social structure, these people are afforded the fewest benefits and the fewest opportunities to participate in the system. Therefore, they develop feelings of apathy, powerlessness, and distrust, all of which lead to political alienation. Concerning the variable of religious fundamentalism, Quinney notes that it emphasizes other worldly concerns, and to a considerable extent it downplays the importance of earthly concern with the social environment. The prevalence of the belief that events and one's own destiny are fixed in advance, make for an orientation toward the world that is essentially fatalistic.

With regard to the research presented thus far, there are general patterns in the nature of the findings. Piaget and Kohlberg both hypothesized that increasingly more mature notions of justice will evolve in a developmental stage sequence only in as much as the morality of authority is superseded by the morality of autonomy. Simply, mature concepts of justice can only develop through the progress made by cooperation and mutual respect. This type of justice presupposes autonomy and, therefore, authority as such can only act to retard this natural development.

The first few studies presented were those aimed at examining Piaget's hypothesis that concepts of justice and morality develop in an invariant stage sequence (Kohlberg,

1963; Turiel, 1966; Irwin, 1971). All three studies supported Piaget's theory of sequentiality. The remaining studies presented were those which examined social or cultural differences in the rate at which concepts of justice develop. All but one study clearly indicate that developmental lags do occur in certain cultures and social systems (Lerner, 1937; Abel, 1941; Dennis, 1943; Durkin, 1959; Quinney, 1964; Najarian-Svajian, 1966; Haan, et al., 1968). The exceptional findings (Tapp, 1970) do not necessarily detract from evidence showing cultural differences, since Tapp's questions were not aimed specifically at children's concepts of justice, but rather, they were aimed at children's concepts of law and order.

Importantly, these findings indicate that the types of environment wherein the natural development of concepts of justice is retarded, are highly similar in their authoritarian and restrictive nature. This factor is consistent with Piaget's theory that mature notions of justice cannot fully develop under the constraining influence of raw authority and the demands of obedience and duty. Among the studies cited, the most extreme example of a constraining atmosphere was the institutional setting described by Abel. However, other social environments may be restrictive because of certain cultural teachings or religious beliefs (Dennis, 1943; Quinney, 1964; Najarian-Svajian, 1966).

Finally, the constraining influence of low social status has been shown to be a factor correlated with the presence of

immature concepts of justice (Lerner, 1937; Abel, 1941; Durkin, 1959; Quinney, 1964). Because of the rigidity of the social structure, poor people have few opportunities to be physically or socially mobile. The resultant feelings of powerlessness, of always being acted upon by uncontrollable external forces, are factors that account for a fatalistic sense of justice.

It is this issue, environmental differences in the development of a sense of justice, that the thesis will deal with. Specifically, concepts of justice among Appalachian children will be examined. The choice of Appalachia as the location for study arose out of pure personal interest in the locale, and because of the prevalence, in that region, of a high degree of mysticism (religious fundamentalism) and fatalistic thought, both of which are regarded to be indicative of immature concepts of justice.

B. Issues in Appalachia

In researching Appalachia and its inhabitants, it was found that a major part of the literature published before 1960 reflects an overly romantic and dilettantish viewpoint. Many of these authors, despite their sincerity, seem to have viewed the poverty and illiteracy as unimportant conditions, outweighed by a lifestyle of hearty individualism and dogged pride. What these books did not deal with are some of the profoundly dehumanizing conditions that can only serve to undermine this individualism and pride. Some more recent

books and articles have begun to expose certain ugly realities about life in Appalachia. Books such as Dunbar's Our Land Too, Caudill's Night Comes to the Cumberlands, and articles like Schrag's "Appalachia: Again the Forgotten Land," all examine the role of the mining companies and what a lifetime of working in the mines really means.

The very existence of many Appalachian towns depends on the presence of the large mining concerns. Historically, these companies have had as little regard for the people as they have had for the land itself. Negligence in providing safe working conditions has resulted in an alarmingly high incidence of fatal and crippling accidents. Of the majority of miners who do survive, few are left without some degree of silicosis or pneumoconiosis ("black lung"), both of which are deadly pulmonary diseases. In terms of compensation, a miner must be examined by company doctors. If he is not satisfied, the miner can then go to his own doctor if he can afford it, or his own lawyer if he can afford it, and then wait out a long trial--if he can afford it. In many counties, the unions have never gained a foothold, so that not even a small pension is available for many disabled and retired miners.

Since much of the land in Appalachia is unsuitable for farming, either because of irregular land contour or because of the ravages of strip mining, agriculture is not an alternative to employment in the only real industry of Appalachia, which is mining. Therefore, when a mine closes down or begins to automate, the only recourse for many unemployed

Appalachians is to go on welfare. More than any other single social institution, the welfare system seems to have undermined mountain pride. To many Appalachian men, especially, accepting a check from the Federal government is painfully emasculating and devastating to their personal, family, and community image. Vivid descriptions of Appalachian families on welfare can be found in Mary Wright's "The Dusty Outskirts of Hope" and in Robert Coles' "Life in Appalachia: The Case of Hugh McCaslin."

Understandably, most Appalachians have become bitter and distrustful toward the Federal government. However, as the Quinney study revealed, many Appalachian residents are equally as suspicious of their county governments. Both Coles' book, Migrants, Sharecroppers, and Mountaineers, and Photiadis' book, Change in Rural Appalachia, point out that in many Appalachian counties, a few families tightly control the school system, the distribution of most county jobs, and the election of county officials. Their power is so absolute, in many instances, that no individual or small interest group dares to oppose them.

Because the people of Appalachia have been, in large part, politically powerless in their dealings with the mining companies, the Federal governments, and their county governments, it is not surprising that many have become cynical and fatalistic about how these institutions control their lives. For a large portion of Appalachians there is some solace in the fundamentalist religious teachings, which proclaim that

the injustices of life are more than compensated for by the heavenly rewards of the hereafter. A graphic description of the strength of that faith occurs in Hedgepeth's article, "He Feels, He Heals, He Turns You On With God."

With reference to the children of Appalachia, there have been a few books written which examine their reactions and adaptations to their unique environment. The most comprehensive book, Coles' Migrants, Sharecroppers, and Mountaineers, deals heavily with family life, especially parent-child relationships and sibling relationships. Coles describes how quickly children learn to respect the absolute authority of their parents, and to accept parental judgments unquestioningly. At an early age most Appalachian children have acquired their parents' strong family loyalties and keen distrust of outsiders. Looff's book, Appalachia's Children, explains how these intense family ties and fears of the outside world have caused severe phobias and separation anxieties among a significantly high number of Appalachian children.

III. PROBLEM

Research findings support the notion that children's concepts of justice evolve in a developmental stage sequence. Further studies have noted cultural and societal differences in the rate at which the sequence develops. Variables within a social system that have been shown to accompany retardation in the development of mature concepts of justice are educational disadvantages, low social status, a sense of fatalism, lack of social and geographic mobility, and certain religious and supernatural beliefs.

The purpose of this study is to examine notions of justice among children in an Appalachian community. The choice of Appalachia as the location for study was based upon the prevalence in that region of a number of social and cultural variables that are thought to restrict the development of a sense of justice.

The attitudes and beliefs of a small group of children are compared for similarities and differences on a selection of the following parameters which the research has highlighted as being prominent indices of concepts of justice: punishment, equality, adult authority, and responsibility.

IV. METHOD

A. Subjects

The research location, a grade school and a high school in one Appalachian community, was obtained through permission of the Superintendent of Schools for a county in southern West Virginia. The chosen community, which will be called Hester, has a population of 300-500 people. It has no industry or commercial business of any sort other than a small grocery store and two gas stations. The vast majority of employed males work for a large, local coal-mining company. A small number of residents commute daily to jobs in the county seat which is the nearest town, a distance of 10-15 miles.

Until recently, Hester has been geographically isolated because of the mountainous terrain and poor roads. Within the past year, however, efforts have begun on building a massive six-lane highway which will connect the state capital with the southernmost sections of the state. The road, which will pass just on the outskirts of Hester, has already brought about structural and economic changes in the community. During the researcher's stay in Hester, it became evident through observation and in talking with the subjects, as well as their teachers, that Hester is clearly in a state of transition; however, it is still too early to predict the long-range effects on the community of its increased exposure to

the outside world.

Hester's schools, two grade schools and one high school, serve not only community residents, but those from outlying rural districts as well. A few students travel as far as fifteen miles over rugged country roads which may become impassable after heavy rains or snow. School buses service all children, although some have to walk a mile or more to meet the bus each morning. According to the principals of the schools, most of the rural families support themselves through farming or they receive welfare payments. Nearly half of the enrollment of both schools comes from rural areas, while the other half is composed of children who live in the community.

An initial visit to the schools was made in January, 1974, in order for the researcher to become acquainted with the community and to talk with the principals about the criteria for the selection of subjects. The principal of the grade school was asked to select six students; the principal of the high school was asked to select four students. Each was encouraged to make their selections with an eye for diversity in age, sex, religious background, socio-economic status, and location of home (i.e. town vs. rural). A suggestion was made that the principals not use intelligence nor behavioral conformity as criteria for selection, but that they consider, instead, eliminating only those students who were thought to be particularly noncommunicative verbally.

In February, 1974, the researcher returned to Hester, to

interview the ten subjects selected by their principals. Prior to each interview some background data on each subject was obtained from either the principal, a teacher, or school records. No formal effort was made to record data on any particular variable (e.g. religious affiliation, socioeconomic status, etc.). The subjects, six grade school students and four high school students, ranged in age from 7-17 years. The rationale for not using children under the age of seven was based upon the recognition that the pre-school child's language comprehension and language facility preclude the effective use of the interview method.

During the process of the interviewing itself, the researcher determined that the interview method, a storytelling technique, was age-inappropriate for the older adolescent subjects. As a result, it was decided that open-ended discussions would be used with the three oldest subjects. In reviewing the data later, the researcher concluded that this information, while interesting, was not directly relevant to the data obtained from the other subjects. Consequently, the data from the three oldest subjects was excluded for the purposes of the paper. The seven remaining subjects ranged in age from 7-14 years. They included six grade school students: two second graders, two fourth graders, and two sixth graders. The one high school subject was a ninth grader.

B. Procedure

Prior to the interviewing, the researcher allowed for

time to talk with the teachers and to meet each of the students individually in the presence of his/her teacher. Each child was asked first if he'd like to participate, and all agreed.

For the grade-school subjects, there were two interviews of approximately one-half hour each, separated by a two-day time lapse. All interviews were held in a lounge set aside for the school's custodians. Despite the occasional interruptions of those needing cleaning supplies, the room provided a quiet, comfortable setting for conversation. For the high-school subject, Miriam, one forty-five minute session allowed adequate time for all the data collection. That interview was held in the principal's office.

Each interview provided time for the subject and researcher to get acquainted. The researcher explained, in a general way, her purpose for coming to Hester. She also described where she came from and how far she traveled. During the initial part of the interviews, subjects were asked about various topics such as the recent flood which damaged much of Hester, and the new road under construction nearby. Subjects were also encouraged to talk about their families: to share feelings about being the oldest, youngest, etc.; to express what it is like to be the only boy or girl in the family; and to talk about who makes the rules in the family, as well as the consequences of those rules being broken.

The major part of the interviews consisted of the

researcher's telling the child a number of stories that involved an issue related to some aspect of justice. (The stories are listed in Appendix A.) Each child was told that he could make up his own endings to the stories. A special effort was made throughout the interviews to offer verbal and nonverbal encouragement so that the child would feel that his ideas were valid and meaningful, and that his responses were not being judged.

After completion of the stories, subjects were asked their feelings about a diversity of topics including cheating, telling on others, and fighting back when punched. They were also encouraged to express their feelings about the fairness and effectiveness of punishments and adult-made rules.

C. Data Collection

The basic rationale for employing the interview method was the recognition that it is better adapted to uncovering and assessing a child's reactions to certain subjective experiences than other techniques such as observational approaches or questionnaires. The direct person-to-person relationship was thought to be especially useful in reducing resistance and facilitating a child's responses.

In considering the nature of the interview questions, it was determined that a selection of projective stories would be used. This story telling-responding situation was felt to provide some structure and guidelines for responding; it is not so directive that it precludes original and spontaneous

responses; and it allows the child to use make-believe as a safeguard in responding to issues that are emotionally charged or which might otherwise call for a "socially acceptable" response.

A total of eleven Piagetian stories were chosen. Each was selected on the basis of the justice-related issue it was designed to yield information on. Those issues included punishment, equality, adult authority, and responsibility. An effort was made to reword language and restructure events in the stories in order to make them more reflective of Appalachian cultural style.

All data was tape recorded and at the end of the sessions each child was allowed to play back the machine and hear his or her own responses. Several children were intrigued at hearing their recorded voices for the first time.

D. Data Analysis

Two procedures were used to examine interview data:

(1) Individual concepts of justice

Separate in-depth studies on each child's concepts of justice were done on the basis of his responses to interview stories. An evaluation of each child's developmental level according to Piaget's stage theory was determined by such indices as the degree to which the child set the necessity for punishment and obedience above consideration of equality, sought justice in authority figures, perceived law to be heteronomous and imposed by adult authorities, and/or discounted extenuating circumstances of the individual.

(2) Parameters of justice

Each of the justice-related issues of punishment, equality, authority, and responsibility were examined separately in terms of the similarities and differences between subjects' responses. An effort was made to determine whether or not the pattern of responses among subjects on each issue supported Piaget's theory that concepts of justice become increasingly mature as a function of age.

V. RESULTS

A. Individual Concepts of Justice

Flora

Background

Flora was a wholesome-looking seven-year-old with a round, babyish face. Her ponytail hairstyle and her mismatched, ill-fitting clothes made her appear noticeably different from her classmates. In describing Flora's "country ways", her second-grade teacher reflected a bemused yet affectionate attitude toward her. She indicated that Flora was shy, especially in groups, and rarely talked unless spoken to.

Flora is the fifth child in a family of nine children. Her father is an unemployed miner who does subsistence farming to supplement the family's welfare payments. During the interview Flora mentioned that her older brothers are needed to help plant and harvest crops. She also described how heavy rains can flood the "hollow" and occasionally keep her and her brothers and sisters from getting to school. Flora's responses to several questions about her family revealed a strong sense of kindred ties.

During the first interview with Flora, she initially seemed quite anxious and confused. In a short time, however, she relaxed visibly and was eager to respond. At the outset of the second interview she even volunteered to sing several country songs. Throughout both interviews it was often difficult to understand Flora's responses because of her pronounced accent.

Data Analysis

Punishment

The punishments that Flora chose to inflict on story characters were consistently expiatory in nature. Given the choice of three punishments, she inevitably picked the most severe, the one that would cause the greatest amount of pain or discomfort. In one response, this tone of severity was evidenced by her use of the element of time: "Keep him home and never let him out to play" (Story I). In another response, severity seemed to border on crude vengeance: "Break all his toys" (Story II).

In explaining her responses, Flora made it clear that her choice of punishments was based on the pain element in each: "It would make him mad"; "Cause he'd have more fun there" (Story I). Implied in both these explanations was the belief that the more painful or aversive a punishment, the more impact it would be likely to have in making the transgressor realize the gravity of his misdeed. Importantly, however, Flora's real emphasis was on expiation, not on prevention. This was evident in her decision to choose a severe punishment as the "fairest" and "best" solution, even though a more lenient punishment--a verbal chastisement--was shown (by her own statement!) to have more preventive value (Story III).

Flora's choices for the least fair punishments were: "Not to do him a favor" (Story I); "To get spanked" (Story II). Because Flora offered no explanation for these choices, it is

impossible to guess what her criteria for rejection were.

In the sphere of immanent justice, Flora's notions about the value of punishments were less excessive. She rejected the mystical belief that automatic justice, in the form of punishment, emanates from inanimate objects. Instead, her answers reflected a realistic understanding of cause-and-effect relationships. In Story VI, for example, she recognized that the boy who disobeyed by playing with the knife had "cut himself accidentally"; and, in Story XI, that the boy who had stolen apples fell off the bridge into the water because "the board was rotten." Basically, Flora repudiated the concept of immanent justice, although she revealed a remnant of such thinking when she acknowledged in Story VI that "the knife knew" the boy had disobeyed.

Equality

For the most part, Flora accorded more importance to the issue of equality than to the issue of punishment. In stories which posed a conflict between the two, Flora set the necessity for equality of treatment above the need to mete out punishment.

In Story VIII Flora insisted that fairness required the mother to give cake to her disobedient daughter as well as to the obedient one; if she didn't, Flora explained, "That'd be cheatin'." Flora also commented that it was unfair for the mother to love one daughter more than the other, implying that the withholding of affection was an inappropriate form of punishment. In the first part of Story IX Flora again

made the issue of equality her major concern. Then, in the second part of the same story, she took a developmental leap forward by according primary consideration to the notion of equity. As mentioned earlier, equity is a more sophisticated concept than equality because it involves taking individual circumstances into account. Thus, in Story IX, Flora chose equity over true equality: she created a sympathetic older brother who wanted his younger sibling to be accorded special consideration because of the latter's age, even though that choice conflicted with equality of treatment.

Flora's only retreat from her emphasis on equality came in response to Story X. Interestingly, she chose punishment over equality in this case, despite the fact that the story presented an unusually severe form of punishment for its protagonist.

Authority

When equality and adult authority were presented as oppositional issues, Flora gave greater weight to the question of authority. She was more concerned in Story IV with one child's breaking a rule imposed by an adult than she was with the inequality of treatment between children by that adult. Story V, which involved one child's doing all his brother's work, elicited a "fair" response from Flora. She reasoned that, "if he never worked, that'd be fair." In both cases she felt that the child should obey the authority figure.

On the issue of justice between children, Flora first rejected the morality of authority. Her answer reflected the

belief that it would be better for a child to deal with a bully by fighting back in his own way, than by enlisting an adult to solve the problem. When questioned further, Flora decided that it might be better for the boy to tell a teacher since, if he didn't, "the biggest boy'd hit him back."

Responsibility

Flora was quite capable of separating her notions of responsibility from her concepts about adult authority and punishment. In the case where these issues were designed to clash (Story VII: an authority figure punishes an entire group for the misdeeds of a few) Flora opposed the practice of collective punishment. Instead, she evidenced a need to individualize responsibility for wrongdoing: "I wouldn't punish the one that didn't use them" (the forbidden scissors).

Summary

Flora's concepts of justice did not place her clearly within any one of Piaget's developmental stages. Her regard for severe and arbitrary punishments, however, was indicative of a common mode of reaction among younger children. Like Piaget's subjects of the same age, Flora placed a great deal of value on duty and obedience. This emphasis was a reflection of her heavy reliance on adult authority.

In several areas, Flora's responses differed markedly from those which Piaget collected among his youngest subjects. For instance, she rejected almost entirely the notion of immanent justice, a belief that Piaget found to be prevalent

among children her age. She also rejected the morality of authority when it conflicted with issues of justice between children. Finally, unlike most children her age, Flora set the value of equality and equity over the need for punishment when the issues conflicted. In sum, Flora showed signs of rather advanced development in her understanding of several justice-related issues. On other issues, however, her responses were more consistent with the age findings of Piaget.

ALEX

Background

Eight-year-old Alex, who was Flora's classmate, conveyed an image very different from her. Alex was a thin, serious-looking boy with a sallow complexion. He spoke in a deep, controlled voice and rarely smiled. Prior to the interview his teacher spent several minutes enthusiastically describing Alex's academic and family background. She noted that he and his older siblings were outstanding students, had always showed model behavior, and were considered by the faculty to be far more mature than their classmates.

Alex is the youngest of three children. His parents both work as clerks and the family lives in Hester a short distance from the school. According to the principal, Alex's family belongs to a strict religious sect, and his parents are quite involved in church activities. His father holds a position on the town council.

During the interview sessions Alex remained serious, almost somber, in responding to the questions. Each of his answers was slow and deliberate, and seemed to have been carefully considered. His controlled responses had a remarkable lack of spontaneity. On the few occasions that Alex had difficulty in responding to a question, he became anxious and embarrassed, almost apologetic about his confusion.

Data Analysis

Punishment

For the most part, Alex chose expiatory types of punishments. His explanations made it clear that his high regard for expiation had little to do with its preventive value; instead, he was more concerned with its punitive value. For example, Alex used the element of fear as a punishment in one story: he sentenced the protagonist to go out on a late-night errand because "it might have been dark then, and it might have been a long way." The answer reflects Alex's belief in the validity of harsh punishments.

In other stories Alex called for "spanking" and lengthy "grounding" as "fair" punishments. When asked about his reasons for the latter judgment, Alex replied, "just 'cause" --the absence of justification being another indicator of expiatory notions. Like Flora, Alex rejected a lenient punishment in favor of a more severe one (Story III), even though he attributed preventive value to the lenient form only.

Alex's regard for expiation wavered just once. In the second part of Story I, Alex chose a nonexpiatory punishment for the protagonist: "Not to do him a favor." His explanation of the choice was that such a punishment would "show him (the transgressor) how they (the transgressed-against) felt about him." The response reflects a reciprocal notion of justice; that is, the "natural" consequence of the misdeed is reciprocal because the transgressor receives back exactly

what he has doled out. Punishment by reciprocity is a more sophisticated concept, developmentally, than expiatory punishment.

The two "unfair" punishments which Alex selected for the characters in Stories I and II were: "Not to give any bread" because doing so would have meant "he might have gotten even hungrier"; and "pay for the window", unfair because "he couldn't have found a job." The nature of both responses suggest that the punishments were rejected because of their impracticality rather than their harshness.

The issue of immanent justice posed problems for Alex. In one story he accepted the notion, while in a later story he rejected it. When Alex was first asked if the protagonist in Story VI would have cut himself whether he had disobeyed or not, Alex said yes. However, Alex quickly added that the boy cut himself "because he was breaking a rule." His explanation confirmed, even further, his belief in the notion of immanent justice: "God knew he was going to break the rules, so he made him cut himself for a punishment." In Story XI, Alex dismissed the concept of immanent justice. Alex's confusion over the issue may have been an indication of early efforts to surrender his belief in automatic justice.

Equality

When equality and punishment were brought into conflict, Alex predominantly chose equality as the critical issue. For instance, Alex felt, as Flora did, that the mother in Story VIII should have loved her daughters equally, and that she

should not have punished disobedience by denying her love. In a couple of stories Alex went beyond the issue of equality to deal with the question of equity. He granted one protagonist in Story IX an extra candy bar to replace the one he had lost because "he's the littlest and . . . they need just about most of the love." The response indicates that Alex gave greater consideration to the extenuating circumstances of the situation (i.e. "He's the littlest") than he did to distributing the rewards equally.

Only once did Alex seriously question the comparative values of punishment and equality. His thought processes can be represented best by an excerpt from the interview data.

(The letter "I" represents Interviewer.)

- I: (tells Story VIII)
 So, what do you think about that story? Was the mother being fair?
- A: In one way, yes, and in another way, no.
- I: What was that?
- A: Yes or no?
- I: What about the yes?
- A: Ah . . . well . . . (muffled) . . . help her daughter do it next time.
- I: O.K. So, that was the fair way. What about the unfair way?
- A: Well, ah They might have been twins and uh . . . they should have gotten the same size piece of cake.
- I: If they hadn't been twins, should they have gotten the same size piece of cake?
- A: Yeh.
- I: They should have gotten it anyway. O.K.

The excerpt reveals Alex's brief struggle with the relative merit of punishment and equality. Ultimately, he accorded greater importance to the issue of equality of treatment.

Authority

For Alex, the question of authority generally prevailed over that of equality. He recognized quite readily that certain story characters were being treated unequally, yet he felt that they should follow the dictates of adult authority regardless of the existing injustice. Alex's reasons for insisting on obedience from the protagonists had nothing to do with a reluctance to break an affectionate adult-child bond of solidarity (a mature reason by Piagetian standards); rather, Alex's reasons were based on the desire to avoid the painful consequences of disobedience--"He (the protagonist) would have went hungry."

On the question of justice between children, Alex's reliance on the use of adult authority was somewhat balanced by an appreciation of "self-defense." In Story XII the protagonist repays a bully by hiding the latter's lunch. Alex didn't think it was "too nice," yet he said that he could understand why the boy acted as he did. Alex said that the best way to stop the bully would have been to ignore him. His second choice was to tell the teacher. Both alternatives are authority-oriented. The first choice, "ignore him," is an adult-imposed slogan and is not naturally consistent with a child's concept of reciprocity. The second choice, quite obviously, represents the direct use of an intervening authority figure.

Responsibility

Alex rejected the notion of collective responsibility.

He was unwilling to accept as just the practice of punishing an entire group for the misdeeds of one or more of its members. Instead, he implied that punishment needs to be individualized so that innocent parties are not treated unjustly. His response indicated that he felt the penalty inflicted upon an innocent individual to be a greater injustice than exempting the guilty from punishment.

Summary

According to Piaget's developmental framework, Alex's concepts of justice placed him closest to Stage I, the level appropriate to his age. He had highly expiatory notions of punishment characteristic of children at the first stage, as well as a strong residual belief in immanent justice. His adherence to duty and obedience was a function of his high regard for authority and authority figures.

In two areas, Alex's answers revealed signs of more advanced thinking than is common among very young children. First, he had begun to see validity in the practice of reciprocal or "natural" punishment (Story I, part 2). This phenomenon indicated his willingness to depart from immature, expiatory notions of justice and move toward a more mature mode of reaction. Second, Alex gave higher priority to the issues of equality and equity than to the issue of punishment. His emphasis represented a more evolved concept than those found with Piagetian subjects of the same age. A broad picture of Alex's sense of justice, however, would place him well within Piagetian age norms.

SHIRLEY

Background

Shirley, age ten, was a tall, thin fourth-grader. Her disheveled hair and outgrown dress gave her a rather unkempt appearance. On the basis of a brief classroom observation it appeared that her classmates approached her rarely, and then only with some caution. Her teacher noted that Shirley was not well-liked by the other children because she "has a chip on her shoulder most of the time." She added that Shirley's schoolwork was sloppy and disorganized, and that she had serious learning problems in almost all subject areas.

According to her teacher and to school records, Shirley's problems extend beyond the school setting. Her family lives several miles from Hester, deep in a mountain hollow. Her father, a disabled miner, receives no compensation, so that the family's only income is from welfare payments. Family finances are apparently so strained that Shirley and her brothers and sisters have missed a great deal of school because they do not have adequate clothing for cold weather.

Shirley's participation in the interviews was generally characterized by a rather detached attitude. Her facial expressions and gestures often revealed a growing annoyance and impatience with the situation. For the most part her responses were brief and unembellished; rarely did she elaborate on her answers. Like Flora, Shirley's pronunciation was so marked that it was often difficult to interpret her responses.

Data Analysis

Punishment

Shirley's responses to questions concerning punishment were a mixture of expiatory as well as reciprocal ideas about justice. Her most frequent choice of punishments was spanking. Each time Shirley was asked her reasons for that judgment, she simply reiterated the misdeed, as though the crime itself explained the punishment. Interestingly, Shirley chose to spank a protagonist only when his misdeed involved having broken a valued object. She chose reciprocal types of punishments for less destructive misdeeds.

Reciprocity, for Shirley, involved doing to the transgressor exactly what he himself had done. Thus, in Story I she prescribed "not doing a favor" as punishment for the boy who had previously refused to do a favor for his parents. On another occasion Shirley shifted midway through a story from an expiatory position to one of reciprocity. In the first part of Story III Shirley determined that the mother should have punished her disobedient child by spanking him. Shirley was then told about another mother who talked to her disobedient child about his behavior. When Shirley was asked which mother was the "fairest" and which had the "best way" for dealing with her son, she chose in both cases the mother who had talked to her son. Shirley's mixed reactions to this story seemed to capture her confusion over the value of different kinds of punishments.

Reciprocity also characterized Shirley's choice of

"unfair" punishments. In Story II Shirley said that it "would be a mean punishment" to break all a child's toys because the child had broken a window. Her reason for eliminating the punishment was because "he (the child) liked to play"; therefore, she rejected the punishment on the basis of its being too harsh, too expiatory in nature.

Shirley's confusion over the question of punishment extended into the area of immanent justice. She rejected, then later accepted the concept. In Story VI Shirley first attributed the protagonist's cutting himself to his own carelessness: "If he's sharpening his pencil with a knife, he's sure to cut himself." Later she pondered the question of whether or not the knife knew that the boy had disobeyed. In Story XI, however, Shirley was certain that the protagonist was being punished when he fell off the rotten bridge with his stolen goods. She wasn't quite as certain, though, who had done the punishing. That issue, of determining who or what was responsible for meting out automatic punishments, was the aspect of immanent justice that seemed to be most perplexing for Shirley.

Equality

Equality was a primary consideration in Shirley's responses. In every circumstance wherein equality and punishment were posed as conflicting values, Shirley determined that equality of treatment was a higher-priority issue than the necessity for punishment. She felt strongly, for instance, that a mother should not give less of her love,

or fewer treats, to a disobedient daughter than to an obedient one (Story VIII). Later, in another story, Shirley again rejected the idea that it is legitimate to deprive children of equal treatment simply to punish them for past misdeeds.

In Story IX Shirley argued the issue of equality from two perspectives. On the one hand, she thought that the child who had lost his candy bar should have been given another one so that all the children would then have one candy bar, and therefore would have been treated equally. On the other hand, Shirley took the posture of a sibling who was angry that his brother got another candy bar, because the extra treat represented inequality in treatment. The predicament suggested that Shirley held equality in such high regard that she felt compelled to examine the issue from more than one position.

Authority

Shirley's concern for equality far outweighed her concern for authority. She felt that it was unfair, for instance, that a parent would ask one child to carry out certain responsibilities while not insisting on the same compliance from the child's sibling (Stories IV, V). For Shirley, "fairness" required that the parent practice equalitarian justice. In line with this thinking, Shirley stated emphatically that the child protagonists in the stories would not obey the parental demands, the implication being that equalitarian justice should prevail over obedience

to authority.

Shirley also rejected the morality of authority when she perceived that it might undermine the resolution of conflicts between children. In defense of the child who hid the bully's lunch (Story XII), Shirley responded, "I think that would be fair enough." She rejected the idea of the protagonist's going to a teacher for help. In fact, when she was asked if the boy could have done anything else to prevent the bully from hitting him, she said "no."

Responsibility

In keeping with her emphasis on equalitarian justice and her willingness to question authority, Shirley rejected the notion of collective responsibility. She implied, by her response to Story VII, that it was unfair for an adult to inflict a general punishment without first having determined the guilt or innocence of each party involved.

One of Shirley's responses, early in the first interview, offered another clue to her understanding of responsibility. In Story I she dismissed the idea of punishing the protagonist because "the kid can get mad or something." Instead, she implied that the mother was mistaken for ever having given her boy such a responsibility, saying, "She ought to went to the store and got the bread herself." Shirley's response seemed to indicate a belief that one should not be held responsible for refusing to carry out an order that was unjustly or improperly given in the first place. If so, the concept would tie in well with her readiness to question adult

authority and to challenge uniform obedience.

Summary

Shirley's sense of justice coincided most closely with the second stage of the Piagetian model. Stage II has been described as a period of equalitarian tendencies. For Shirley, this description was suitable because of her persistent emphasis on securing equal treatment for the story characters. Shirley's regard for the issue of equality overrode all other considerations, including the necessity for punishment and for obedience to adult authority.

As an issue separate from that of equality, punishment seemed to puzzle Shirley. Her expiatory notions about punishment led her to advocate spanking as the fairest penalty for misbehavior. Conversely, her tendency toward reciprocity brought forth responses in which the punishment was more analogous to the crime. Shirley's confusion was also evident in her muddled understanding of immanent justice. Importantly, Shirley's somewhat limited comprehension of the broad concept of punishment was age-appropriate by Piagetian norms.

JOHN

Background

Though only ten, John seemed older than his years in many ways. His thin body frame, somewhat stooped shoulders, and sharply chiseled features gave him a remarkably unchild-like appearance despite his small stature. Many of his manners also belied his age: an even-toned voice, a relaxed posture, and a direct gaze when speaking. John's teacher described him with little enthusiasm as "a good student, well-behaved, no problem." She added that, though he was not particularly talkative or athletically inclined, he seemed to get along fine with other children.

Both of John's parents work, his father as a mental health professional, his mother as a clerk. John is an only child and lives with his parents and grandmother in a large home not far from the school. Of the students interviewed, John was one of only two who remembered ever having traveled outside the county.

John appeared to relax quickly and enjoy both interview sessions. His responses, for the most part, were brief and usually came after a moment's reflection. It was often difficult to know whether his slow, careful way of responding was a product more of uncertainty or of thoughtfulness.

Data Analysis

Punishment

Reciprocity characterized all of John's answers regarding punishment. His choices were never harsh or coercive. Instead, John chose punishments that were designed primarily to show the transgressor that his behavior had made for a breach of the social bond between himself and an adult figure. In Story I, for instance, John determined that "not doing him (the transgressor) a favor" would be just punishment for the child who had refused to do a favor for his parents. In another case, John used social isolation as a measure of reciprocity: "Leave him in his room for an hour or so."

John's decisions about "unfair" punishments were also made with regard for reciprocity. He determined that punishing a child by depriving him of food was unjust because the child "might starve" (Story I). He also rejected the idea of purposely breaking a child's toys as punishment for misbehavior. Both punishments were deemed unacceptable because of their expiatory nature. John also thought that it was unfair for an adult to delay punishment: "If he (the child) didn't obey him (the father), he should have punished him right then, not waited til some other time" (Story X).

Despite John's expressed willingness to discard expiation, he had a great deal of trouble letting go of his notions about a related concept, immanent justice. In Story VI John attributed the protagonist's having cut himself to the fact that the child had disobeyed. The injury, then, was the child's punishment. Conversely, in Story XI John rejected immanent justice, deciding instead that the bridge

had fallen in accidentally, not because it was punishing the child for having stolen apples. In both stories John was uncertain whether or not the inanimate objects "knew" about the misdeeds.

Equality

John's concern for equality was consistently evident in his responses. In those stories which involved a conflict between equality of treatment on the one hand, and the necessity for punishment on the other, John equated justice with the former issue only. He felt, therefore, that it was unfair for adults to distribute treats, material necessities, or affection in an unequal manner (Stories VIII, X). John's responses indicated a belief that punishment cannot be fair if it disregards equalitarian practices.

John's thoughts about "fairness" also included an appreciation for the concept of equity. He was able to take into account, for instance, the special circumstances involved for the protagonist in Story IX (i.e. the child's being the youngest). If John had decided in favor of pure justice (in this case, equality), then he would not have thought the child should be given another candy bar to replace the one he lost. Instead, John based his decision on a more subtle notion about justice: that one must consider the unique circumstances of the individual involved. Thus, in Story IX John determined that it was fair to give more to a child who was limited because of his youthfulness or his skills.

Authority

For John, the use of authority was judged to be unfair when it interfered with equality of treatment. In Story IV, for instance, John stated that it was not fair for a mother to insist that only one of her two children help her. When John was asked how the protagonist might have felt about the injustice, he said, "She probably didn't like it. She probably cried and told her (the mother) that he (the brother) didn't do it (his share)." For Story V John also judged the father to be unfair when he demanded help from only one of his children. John suggested that the father "should have sent the other one to make him start liking it more."

Despite John's willingness to verbally challenge the unfair use of authority, he did not advocate defying that authority through disobedience. Instead, he had the protagonists in the stories carry out the adults' orders in spite of their awareness of the obvious injustices. John's fantasy about the angry, tearful protests of the female protagonist in Story IV suggested that he was anticipating some sort of inevitable compliance from her. Compliance under those circumstances would have been indicative of a belief that authority must prevail over justice (in this case, equality). Another source of compliance not evidenced in John's responses but found among older Piagetians was based on voluntary cooperation rather than forced obedience.

Regarding the matter of justice between children, John rejected the morality of authority. When he was questioned

about the tactics of the protagonist in Story XII, John was appreciative of the boy's attempts to solve his problem with another child, without seeking adult intervention. John commented, "He (the protagonist) was trying to get him (the bully) back, and I probably would have done it too . . . to get him back." Thus, John chose to rely on what Piaget termed the "morality of relations between children," rather than calling on an authority figure.

Responsibility

John was willing to reject the notion of collective responsibility only if the innocent party would speak out and declare his innocence (Story VII). The response seemed to suggest a certain regard for the rights as well as the power of an authority figure; that is, from the adult's viewpoint, the collective punishment was admissible even if it was not truly just. John's regard for the individual rights of the child, however, rested on the assumption that the child was responsible for taking his own defensive or protective measures to counter adult authority.

Summary

By Piagetian norms, John's sense of justice was most closely identifiable in terms of the second stage of development. A characteristic value of children in Stage II is a strong preference for reciprocal rather than expiatory types of punishment. Like most Piagetian subjects close to his age, John rejected harsh penalties in favor of the "natural"

punishments implied by reciprocity. Also, John's inconsistent attitude regarding immanent justice seemed to reflect declining acceptance of the notion, a phenomenon which Piaget observed to be characteristic of the second stage of development.

Many of John's responses concerning equality were consistent with Piagetian findings. John emphasized, for instance, that equality of treatment was a more important issue of justice than the necessity for punishment. He was even able to incorporate the concept of equity, of giving special consideration to individual circumstances, into his own sense of justice. However, unlike many children his age, John's regard for authority prevented him from advocating disobedience as an acceptable response when the misuse of adult prerogative interfered with equalitarian treatment. He was able to repudiate the morality of authority only when it jeopardized the resolution of justice between children. In spite of John's reluctance to question the rule of obedience, however, his attitudes toward punishment, equality, and responsibility were strong indicators of an age-appropriate sense of justice.

LOUIS

Background

Louis was a good-looking twelve-year-old whose large stature and deep voice made him appear older than most of his classmates. His teacher reported that Louis had many friends and was a good athlete and a fair student, but that he had been an occasional behavior problem for his teachers. She seemed unwilling to elaborate on any of these observations.

Louis is the third of five children. Two older brothers attend the local high school. His father is a mechanic, does hauling of various sorts, and has a small towing service; his mother helps by taking business phone calls. The family lives in a tiny, rural community about five miles from Hester.

During the interview sessions, Louis was an animated participant. He smiled frequently and often used facial and hand gestures to accompany his verbal responses. Unlike several other subjects, he did not seem at all uncomfortable with not having any answers or thoughts on particular questions.

Data AnalysisPunishment

Louis's ideas about punishment were predominantly expiatory in nature, though at times his thinking reflected some understanding of reciprocity. With few exceptions Louis chose spanking as the fairest punishment for transgressors.

His reasons for selecting such a penalty included prevention (e.g. "would remind him the next time") and simple indignation (e.g. "breakin' a window costs money"). Neither type of explanation indicated an understanding of a reciprocal relationship between the content of the guilty act and the nature of its punishment. Instead, Louis's choice of corporal punishment reflected a belief that a punishment's fairness is a function only of its severity, a highly expiatory way of thinking.

When Louis did choose reciprocal kinds of punishment, he had difficulty understanding how he made his decisions. In the second part of Story I, Louis chose the punishment "not to do him (the transgressor) a favor." When Louis was asked why that was the fairest punishment, he said that he didn't know. Similarly, Louis was unable to explain why he had selected the two "unfair" punishments. Both of the unfair punishments were decidedly expiatory, making Louis's rejection of them tantamount to a rejection of the concept of expiation.

Louis's confusion over the purpose and nature of punishments was best illustrated by his response to the second part of Story II. He prescribed spanking, an expiatory type of punishment, for the transgressor. When questioned why his choice would be the fairest one, Louis explained, "So he (the transgressor) wouldn't have to get a lot of work, or get all his toys broken that they (the parents) paid for." Louis's judgment in this instance was not based on expiation but,

rather, was based on a process of eliminating the more severe or arbitrary punishments. It would seem that Louis's choice of an expiatory punishment was the outcome of nonexpiatory thinking.

The concept of immanent justice also confounded Louis. In Story VI Louis thought that the protagonist was cut because "he didn't mind the teacher;" Louis was uncertain, however, whether or not the knife "knew" that the boy had disobeyed. While Louis readily accepted immanent justice in Story VI, he found the same issue troublesome in another story. In Story XI Louis first reasoned that the bridge had fallen in because the boy was being punished for stealing. Louis was then asked if the boy would have fallen into the water even if he hadn't been stealing. Louis said "yes," implying that the event was an accident. Once again the story was repeated and Louis determined that the bridge fell in because the protagonist was being punished; however, Louis did not think that the bridge knew about the misdeed.

Equality

Louis consistently favored equality of treatment over the necessity for punishment when the issues were in opposition to one another. He thought, for instance, that it was unfair for a mother to punish a disobedient child by arbitrarily refusing her the same treats and affections bestowed upon an obedient child. When Louis was questioned about his judgments, he responded that he didn't know why such punishments

would be unfair. In Story X, however, Louis did have a response as to why a particular punishment would be unfair. He said that it would be unfair for a father to punish his son by depriving him of new shoes while giving a pair to each of the boy's siblings. Louis stated: "He (the father) is making him (the disobedient son) go places with holes in his shoes and people are talking about him and stuff." In this case, Louis recognized not only the fact of inequality in treatment, but also the inappropriateness of the punishment. Louis determined, instead, that the father should "whip him" in order to make the boy obey. Louis's choice, while clearly of the expiatory type, was less harsh from his perspective than depriving the child of shoes.

In one instance, Louis's thoughts about justice expanded to include the concept of equity. He felt that the mother in Story IX would give her youngest child another candy bar to replace the one he had lost. When questioned, Louis said that he didn't know why the mother would do this. Later, however, when Louis had determined that the mother probably wouldn't have given a second treat to an older child, he explained: "Some people like the youngest best . . . better than they do the eldest." Louis's reason suggested that, while he had some understanding and appreciation for an individual's special needs, he had difficulty reconciling that notion with his regard for equality of treatment. His dilemma became evident when he stated that the protagonist's older sister "would get mad because she never got as much . . . (he) got

more."

Authority

Louis decided that the use of authority was unfair when it contradicted equality of treatment. In Stories IV and V he condemned as "unfair" the practice of a parent demanding compliance from one child and not from another. When Louis was asked whether or not the child would obey despite the injustice, he gave differing responses: he felt that the protagonist in Story IV would not obey her mother, while the protagonist in Story V would, in fact, obey his father. Because Louis did not elaborate on his answers, it was difficult to determine whether his decision was arbitrary, was based on the sex of the parent authority, or was a product of some other variable.

Although Louis rejected obvious injustices in the application of authority, he determined that authority could be used legitimately to resolve conflicts between children. In Story XII Louis felt that "to tell the teacher" would have been the best way for a young child to stop an older child from hitting him. When Louis was questioned further it became obvious that his reasoning was based on a consideration of practicality rather than of values; that is, Louis turned to the use of authority out of regard for the adult's power rather than a regard for the "fairness" of such a tactic. Louis was convinced that the most efficacious way of obtaining redress was to call in a grown-up. By Piagetian standards Louis's

belief was not age-appropriate because it lacked any appreciation for the value of reciprocity between children.

Responsibility

When Louis was first told Story VII he determined that collective punishment for the protagonists was an appropriate consequence because "they disobeyed the teacher." The story, however, involved three children, only two of whom had been disobedient. Before the story was completed for the second time, Louis interrupted and said, "She (the teacher) should have just punished the two that used the scissors." He went on to say that the third child should not have been punished because "she minded the teacher."

Louis's explanation made it clear that he was unwilling to accept the notion of collective responsibility, or guilt by association. Even though many of his previous responses indicated a high regard for authority and for the value of punishment, Louis was unable to justify an adult action when it involved penalizing the innocent.

Summary

Louis revealed a less mature understanding of several basic parameters of justice than was age-appropriate by Piagetian norms. Piaget's research indicated that by the age of twelve, Louis's age, the great majority of children had exchanged expiatory notions of justice for an appreciation of reciprocity. Louis, conversely, retained his faith in punishment by expiation and therefore frequently chose spanking

as the "fairest" punishment for protagonists. Even Louis's occasional nonexpiatory responses seemed to suggest that he had devised no clear criterion for retribution.

Louis's limited and confused understanding of the nature of punishment extended into the area of immanent justice. In one story Louis rejected this notion of an automatic justice being meted out by an inanimate object, while in another story he defended the notion. According to Piaget, "the idea of a justice immanent in things could not appear unaided in the mind of a child of twelve." Thus, in this instance, Louis's formula for justice indicated that his developmental lag could probably be attributed to adult intervention and constraint.

Another area in which Louis revealed an arrested sense of justice was that involving conflicts between children. Instead of relying on the child protagonist to reciprocate in kind against another child who did him an injustice, Louis believed that the injured child should call upon an adult to inflict an expiatory kind of punishment against the offender. In essence, Piaget believed that such reliance on the morality of authority occurred naturally as a function of development among very young children, but that it diminished with age as the solidarity between children increased. For Louis, however, authority still held sway in matters of justice between children.

On the issues of equality and responsibility Louis's responses were generally age-appropriate. He valued equality

of treatment over the necessity for punishment when the two conflicted. He also discarded the notion of collective responsibility even though doing so involved challenging adult authority. In one instance, Louis even revealed some understanding and appreciation for the concept of equity.

Because of the obvious inconsistencies in Louis's responses to stories, it would be impossible to place him clearly within any one of Piaget's phases of development. Louis's attitudes about equality and responsibility, for instance, were indicative of the third phase in the development of a sense of justice. On the other hand, his views on punishment and, to some extent, his views on authority were little beyond phase I. On the basis of Piaget's research, the delayed aspects of Louis's sense of justice are attributable to adult constraint.

ROWENA

Background

Twelve-year-old Rowena was a frail-looking girl whose long, thick hair nearly hid her tiny face. She wore clothes that were attractive and well made although they were overly dressy in comparison to most of the other students. Rowena seemed to be well liked by both her teachers and her classmates. One teacher termed her "delightful," another "a dear." She was also described as a good student.

The principal shared information about Rowena's background. For almost ten years Rowena had lived with her parents and younger sister in a community about twenty miles from Hester where her father was employed as a coal miner. When the entire community was destroyed by a flood two years ago, Rowena and her sister were sent to Hester to live with their grandparents. They have lived there since and the parents have not asked to have them returned. The principal commented, without elaborating, that she thought the girls preferred their present living situation.

Although Rowena gave full interest and cooperation during the interview, her nervousness and discomfort in the situation were obvious. As she sat in her seat she fidgeted constantly. Her responses were often punctuated by short episodes of nervous laughter, especially when she seemed to be uncertain about an answer. Unlike most of the other subjects, Rowena's discomfort did not abate as the sessions progressed.

Data Analysis

Punishment

The types of punishments that Rowena chose for the story characters were varied. On several occasions she decided that spanking was the "fairest" punishment for those who had done misdeeds. When Rowena was asked why spanking would be fair, she responded that it "might make him do something the next time" (Story I, part 1). The nature of her explanation indicated that the coercive power of the punishment justified its use.

Rowena's regard for expiatory punishments was no greater in number of responses than her regard for reciprocal types of punishment. In part 2 of Story I, for instance, Rowena determined that "not to do him (the protagonist) a favor" was the fairest punishment because "when his mother asked him to do something he wouldn't do it, so why should she do it for him." In this instance Rowena's choice was based on what Piaget termed "reciprocity proper"; that is, she chose a punishment that consisted of doing to the child exactly what he himself had done. The punishment, which was neither arbitrary nor severe, was designed to make the child understand the result of his actions. Piaget warned, however, that his subjects sometimes misused this type of punishment by regarding it as a means to "give back evil for evil."

In the sphere of immanent justice Rowena was firmly convinced that there was a natural connection in the stories

between the misdeeds committed by the protagonists and the physical phenomena which served as punishments for them. In Story VI, for instance, Rowena explained that the child had cut himself because "he never asked his teacher and he went right ahead and did it anyway." When Rowena was asked why the child in Story XI had fallen into the creek, she replied that it was because "he was doin' mean and . . . that was just his punishment." For both stories Rowena determined that the punishing objects, the knife and the bridge, "probably" knew about the misdeeds.

Equality

Rowena's regard for equality of treatment was consistently evident in her responses. She determined that it was not fair for a mother to bestow her love unequally to her children, even though one had been disobedient (Story VIII). Rowena explained that "even if the one little girl didn't listen to her and everything all the time, she should be fair with her, too." Similarly, in Story X Rowena thought that it was unfair for a father to refuse to buy a pair of much-needed shoes for one of his children because that child had disobeyed. Rowena's dislike for the unfairness of such punishments was twofold: she objected to their harsh and arbitrary quality, as well as to the inequitable manner in which they were distributed.

At one point Rowena's views about equality were challenged by her need to consider the extenuating circumstances of a

situation. In Story IX Rowena decided that a mother would "probably" give one of her children a second candy bar if he lost the first one she had given him. Rowena explained that the mother would do this because the child was the youngest. When Rowena was asked whether an older sister would think the mother was being fair, she said, "no." Rowena was then asked if an older brother would think the mother's actions were fair. She said, "if he were old enough to understand." The nature of Rowena's answers to these stories suggested that she had not fully resolved her conflicting desires to preserve true equality on the one hand and, on the other, to insure that exceptions in the area of equity could be made for special individual circumstances.

Authority

Like her classmate, Louis, Rowena felt that authority was used unfairly when it contradicted equality of treatment. In both Stories IV and V she disapproved of the authority figures who expected their orders to be obeyed by one child, yet not by another. For Rowena, fairness dictated that the adult should insist on compliance from both children. Importantly, however, Rowena determined in both instances that the child would obey the authority figure despite the obvious injustice.

Nothing in Rowena's explanation indicated that she believed obedience to be a gesture of good will or a voluntary show of affection toward an adult; rather, her responses

indicated a belief that the rule of obedience must prevail over justice out of unilateral respect for authority. Thus, despite Rowena's expressed disapproval of the unfair use of authority, she ultimately determined that obedience to authority was a necessity.

Reliance on authority also prevailed in Rowena's responses to stories concerning justice between children. Although Rowena said that she understood why a child would take a certain action to reciprocate against the bullying of an older child (Story XII), she determined that the protagonist was wrong to have taken responsibility for rectifying the situation himself. Instead, she felt that the child should have summoned the aid of a teacher. Her adherence to authority was evidenced throughout her responses.

Responsibility

Rowena was quick to reject the idea of collective responsibility. Her response to Story VIII was that only two children should have been punished because the third child, "well, she didn't want to do it." It seemed that Rowena interpreted the story to mean that the protagonist had, in fact, disobeyed, but that the child's reluctance should have exempted her from punishment. Rowena's tolerant attitude was somewhat surprising in view of the fact that many of her previous responses emphasized the need for punishment as well as the need to justify authority.

Summary

Rowena's concepts of justice were too varied developmentally to have placed her clearly within any one Piagetian stage. Her continued need to see expiatory types of punishments as being morally necessary in many instances, indicated that her criterion for retribution was of a type common to very young children, not to pre-adolescents. Even though Rowena was often able to see merit in punishment by reciprocity, her frequent retreats to harsh and arbitrary punishments were, by Piagetian standards, indicators of restricted and immature notions of justice. Likewise, her strong belief in immanent justice had prevailed long past a time when it could have been considered age-appropriate.

Another area in which Rowena showed signs of developmental delay was that of the use of authority. Her responses indicated that her regard for authority was so high that it demanded obedience even in the face of obvious injustice. Her answers also revealed her belief in the morality of authority concerning matters of justice between children.

The one area in which Rowena exhibited a sense of justice that was comparable to findings about her age group was that of equality; she was firm in her regard for the equal treatment of children by adults. Despite this regard, however, Rowena's use of harsh punishments and her reliance on the use of authority were strong indicators of a slowed development in her sense of justice.

MIRIAM

Background

Miriam, the oldest of the subjects, was a fourteen-year-old ninth grader. Her tall, lanky frame was accentuated by a long, loose-fitting shirt and light denim jeans. When she smiled, as she often did, she revealed prominent dimples and a heavy set of braces. Miriam's principal, in commenting on why he selected her, noted that she was "quite a talker when she got started" and "she'll tell you just how she feels."

Most of the background information on Miriam was gleaned from the interview sessions. She is the middle child and only girl in her family. Her father, who is a skilled miner, supervises a safety team at a local mine. She has always lived in Hester although the family's home recently had to be moved to make way for the construction of the new road.

Miriam was the most fluent of the subject--a fact not surprising because of her comparative age. She needed little encouragement to talk and she expounded quite freely on any question that interested her. Throughout the sessions she evidenced a rich and spontaneous sense of humor.

Data Analysis**Punishment**

Almost without exception Miriam chose punishments that were based on reciprocity. The most notable feature of her responses was her persistent attempts to gather and consider

facts about the particular circumstances of the protagonist. After hearing the stories and being asked to choose the fairest punishments, Miriam asked twice, "How old is he?" (Stories I and III) She explained that, "if he was real old, the second one (a spanking) would be cruel" (Story I).

Miriam's regard for each individual's situation even extended into the area of personality factors. In Story I, which involved a boy's disinterest in running an errand for his mother, Miriam first suggested that he might be deprived of something. She paused a second and added, "I guess if he did it again, it might just be the way he is." Unlike any of the other subjects, Miriam focused on the need for punishment to be weighed not only on the basis of the misdeed itself, but on the variety of factors that influenced or characterized the protagonist.

The reciprocal nature of Miriam's responses was well illustrated by her frequent references to the preventive rather than the punitive value of certain punishments. On several occasions she emphasized the importance of explaining to a child why he was being punished. The following excerpt was indicative of her philosophy:

M: well, you should explain anyway if you were going to spank him or deprive him, why you were going to do it.

I: You should explain anyway. O.K. Do you think that a child that has something explained to him would be less likely to do it again than somebody who was just spanked and not explained (to)?

M: Yeh! 'Cause he might wonder how come he was spanked. What did he do? If you don't tell him he did something wrong, he wouldn't know.

(Story III)

Miriam's comments revealed her belief that punishment was useless and, equally as important, unfair if it was not accompanied by a proper explanation. She realized, furthermore, that a severe punishment was not necessary in order for a child to recognize the consequences of his misdeed.

In light of Miriam's views on punishment, it was not surprising that she totally rejected the notion of immanent justice. Her repudiation of the idea that inanimate objects might dispense justice in the absence of an adult, was so obvious to the interviewer that the second story involving immanent justice was never related to her. Interestingly, Miriam may have been recollecting one of her own earlier experiences with the phenomenon when she mused aloud, "It was an accident but it might teach him not to do it."

Equality

Miriam's views about equality appeared to be somewhat less clearcut than those regarding other issues of justice. Her apparent confusion seemed to stem from a desire to consider both the child's position as well as that of the adult. In Story VIII, for instance, Miriam took a parental perspective that sanctioned rewarding an obedient child while depriving a disobedient child of the same treatment. When asked if such an action was fair, Miriam responded, "Yeh, 'cause it

might make the other one want to do it." Miriam qualified her position by saying that the parent should not apply punishment indiscriminantly but that she should "do it to her at one time, not every time."

The latter part of Story VIII involved another type of inequality of treatment, loving an obedient child more than a disobedient one. Unlike the first part of the story, however, it elicited a negative reaction from Miriam. She stated flatly that such treatment was unfair because "they're both her children. They're just different people. People are different." Once again the explanation revealed Miriam's strong respect for the legitimacy of individual differences.

Miriam's responses indicated that she accepted or rejected the unequal treatment of children by adults on the basis of the severity or appropriateness of the punishment. For instance, a mother might be permitted to give more sweets to a child who obeyed her than to one who did not. On the other hand, the mother most certainly would have been unfair to dole out her love in the same unequal manner (Story VIII). Likewise, Miriam could not accept as fair the idea of a father punishing one child by refusing him a pair of shoes (Story X). Miriam explained, "Well, he should punish him or reward the others but that might not really be the best way because like in the cold or the wet your shoes You should try to have good shoes." Clearly, Miriam's sense of justice precluded the use of these types of punishment, not because of inequalities in distributing them, but because of the harsh

and arbitrary nature of the punishments themselves.

Authority

When the use of authority was in contradiction to equal treatment, Miriam was quick to label the adult's action as unfair. She felt that one child should not be asked to assume additional tasks assigned to another child (Story IV), nor should an especially compliant child be given extra work simply because of his obedient nature (Story V). Miriam's regard for equal treatment was in accord with the vast majority of other subjects' responses on the issue.

Miriam's departure from the consensus occurred in her attitude toward the matter of obedience to authority. While most of the subjects said that they would obey the adult despite the obvious injustice, their explanations indicated that they chose obedience because they felt that the nature of authority inevitably demanded compliance. In other words they "chose" reluctantly to obey because they saw no real alternative. For Miriam, however, the decision to carry out the adult's order was made out of a desire to be agreeable and helpful, not because she feared a forced compliance. Piaget viewed this type of approach to authority as a healthy sign of developing autonomy. He felt that it signified a higher form of reciprocity in which the child had learned to take into account the special bonds of affection between parent and child. He termed the phenomenon a "free manifestation of friendliness" (Piaget, 1965).

On the issue of justice between children, Miriam decided in favor of children resolving their own conflicts rather than by relying on authority figures. She reasoned, "On the one hand he's gettin' him (the bully) back the only way he could 'cause he couldn't beat up on him so he's just trying to get back at him so he won't do it no more." At one point Miriam considered calling in an older brother to assist the protagonist but she later rejected that solution in favor of the boy's handling the situation himself.

Responsibility

Miriam rejected the notion of collective responsibility as did all the other subjects. Beyond that, she was the only subject to lay responsibility for finding out the identity of the culprits at the feet of the adult. Other subjects had expressed disapproval of collective punishment but had offered no suggestions about how the adult might get at the truth. Miriam felt that the teacher should have asked the children directly. In partial defense of the teacher, however, Miriam added, "Sometimes things look like they happened which they didn't but in that case it woulda' looked like they all three did it."

Summary

By Piagetian norms Miriam's sense of justice was typical of the third and most advanced stage of development; she rejected expiatory types of punishment in favor of reci-

procal ones and she emphasized the preventive rather than the punitive value of punishments. More than any other subject Miriam recognized the importance of explaining the reasons for punishments to children.

Equality was a higher priority issue for Miriam than was punishment or authority, although Miriam was often able to recognize, if not accept, the adult's position. Because of this, it would seem that her willingness to obey an adult who had not treated her in a just way was a sign that she valued cooperative relationships with adults. Piaget would have said that she was developing an autonomous sense of justice.

Finally, the attitude that revealed most clearly Miriam's evolved sense of justice was her consideration of individual circumstances. This taking into account the personal situation of each individual is what Piaget termed "equity." Its presence in a child's thinking indicates a more subtle and sophisticated conception of justice than pure equalitarianism. A sentence which Miriam used frequently, "People are just different," seemed to capture her ability to take attenuating circumstances into account in matters of justice.

B. Parameters of Justice

1. Punishment

Piagetian-based views on punishment hold that there are two basic types of reactions among children with regard to punishment. The more primitive reaction which is common to children below the age of six or seven is that of expiation. Punishment by expiation is based on the belief that punishment itself is the essence of morality and that it must be severe in order to have a lasting effect on the culprit. Young children and children whose senses of justice have been retarded due to restrictive environmental influences generally view most punishments as legitimate simply because they emanate from adults.

As children grow older their developing sense of justice will bring them to reject arbitrary and vindictive punishments in favor of reciprocal ones. This second, more mature mode of reaction, entails restoring the status quo by allowing the transgressor to endure the natural consequences of his misdeed rather than by inflicting a harsh, contrived punishment. Piaget's research led him to believe that as children grow older their developing senses of justice lead them increasingly to value measures of reciprocity.

Among subjects interviewed, concepts of appropriate sorts of punishments varied widely. Flora, for instance, chose expiatory punishments for all the story characters; however, the punishments became less severe and outlandish as

the interview progressed. Shirley, Alex, and Louis, on the other hand, chose increasingly more severe types of punishments with each new story. Only John and Miriam remained fairly consistent throughout the stories in choosing reciprocal types of punishments.

In terms of the correlation between the type of misdeed and the choice of punishment, the two stories which involved breaking a valued object (Stories II, III) elicited the most severe punishments, the favorite one being "a spanking." Story I, which involved a child's passive refusal to do an errand for his mother, was met with far more appropriate reciprocal types of punishment such as "not doing him (the child) a favor." The pattern of responses among subjects revealed that they were more likely to choose physical punishments for misdeeds involving physical damage, while they were more apt to choose negative social consequences for misdeeds involving anti-social or asocial behavior.

One element on which there was general agreement among subjects was that of the "least fair" choice of alternative punishments in Story I. All but Flora agreed that "not to give him any food" was the most unfair punishment for the protagonist. The six subjects were firm in their belief that such a punishment was quite unjust. In Story II, however, the choice of the least fair punishment varied widely: Alex thought it most unjust for a child to "have to pay for the window" due to the fact that he "couldn't have found a job;" Shirley rejected as unjust the idea of a

child's having his toys broken on purpose because, after all, "he broke the window by accident;" Miriam disapproved of "spanking" because she felt it was cruel "if he's real old." In sum, most of the subjects viewed as unjust those punishments which were unachievable, age-inappropriate, or which disregarded the element of intent.

While some of the subjects were capable of recognizing that punishment need not be harsh and inflexible in order to be effective, others clung to rigid, expiatory notions about punishment far beyond the ages at which Piaget deemed them appropriate. To that extent, the overall picture of the subjects' views about punishment indicated some developmental delay. This delay was most evident as regards the notion of immanent justice. Alex and Shirley, both ten-year-olds, had great difficulty rejecting the belief. In sharp contrast, Piaget's research concluded that most ten-year-olds have little residual faith in immanent justice.

Far more inappropriate, however, were the responses of the two twelve-year-olds, Louis and Rowena. They both accepted, almost without reservation, the notion that inanimate objects are capable of doling out punishments. Even though the oldest subject, fourteen-year-old Miriam, totally rejected immanent justice, it is difficult to ignore the fact that two subjects showed some delay, and two other subjects showed extreme delay in their development of mature views about punishment.

2. Equality

One tenet of Piaget's developmental theory is that equalitarian ideas become more and more evident in a child's thinking as he matures. For young children the question of equality does not even arise because they place much greater value on punishment and authority. Piaget held that these values begin to reverse themselves as the child grows, so that equality becomes of higher priority than either punishment or regard for authority.

The process of change starts about the age of seven or eight and should be well defined in the child's thinking until he reaches the age of eleven or twelve. By this time, Piaget concluded, the child should begin to broaden his views about equalitarian justice to encompass the concept of equity. When he reaches this level of development, the child can make equality more effectual and more just because he takes into account the attenuating circumstances of each situation.

With striking consistency the subjects interviewed revealed mature views about equality. Each subject agreed, for instance, that a mother should not punish a disobedient child by withholding her affection, but should give love equally to her children no matter how much one might misbehave (Story VIII). In Story X all subjects except Flora again rejected the idea that it is legitimate to deprive children of equal treatment simply to punish them for past misdeeds. Thus, the subjects displayed a marked preference for equality over punishment when the two issues were

brought into conflict--a phenomenon which Piaget would have viewed as one indicator of mature concepts about justice.

The most impressive set of responses in terms of sophisticated conceptualizing about justice were those which reflected an understanding of the principle of equity. Story IX furnished just such a situation. Six of seven subjects determined that justice was better served if pure equality was by-passed in favor of special consideration for the protagonist. Thus, the child in Story IX was accorded an extra allotment because of his youthfulness. The prevalent signs among the subjects of a high regard for equality and even for equity, indicate no developmental delay in this area.

3. Authority

Since the child's desire for equality is sometimes pitted against the fact of authority, it is important to find out how such a conflict is resolved by children of different ages. For instance, every child has experienced an episode in which an adult was not strictly impartial in distributing rewards or punishments to him. The dilemma for the child then becomes one of either defending the principle of justice (equality in this case) or defending the principle of authority or the authority figure.

Piaget's research revealed that the dilemma is generally resolved differently for children of various age groups. Very young children, especially under the age of six, incline heavily toward authority. They regard adult orders as "fair"

out of unilateral respect for authority. Obedience naturally fits in well with this sort of thinking. With age, children become more and more aware of the injustice of unequal treatment yet they still determine that the rule of obedience comes before justice. Finally, by the age of nine or ten, the vast majority of subjects in Piaget's studies placed greater value on justice than on the necessity for obedience.

The last phase in the development of modes for dealing with conflicts between justice and authority is that in which the child is capable of recognizing the injustice on the one hand yet, on the other hand, feels that it is better to react with voluntary compliance (i.e., obedience). In other words, the child is agreeable and cooperative out of feelings of affection for the adult, not out of blind respect or fear of the adult's power.

Piaget combined these last two types of reactions, non-obedience to an unjust command and voluntary obedience to a respected adult, into one group which he felt to be representative of the most mature understanding of the issue of authority.

Subjects' attitudes in the study were ascertained from their responses to Stories IV and V. The stories involved characters who were being treated unequally by a parent, one child having been ordered to do more than his/her fair share of the work. In both stories, six out of seven subjects responded that such commands were unfair. Flora, the youngest subject, said that such an order was indeed fair

because in her family one brother did all the work. Of her other brother, Flora said, "He don't help . . . and he don't want to do nothin'."

On the matter of obedience all subjects were asked whether the character in Story V would obey the parent despite the obvious injustice. Six subjects said yes. Only Shirley responded with a firm "no", the implication being that equalitarian justice should prevail over obedience to authority. The critical question in terms of the other six subjects concerns the reasons behind their decisions to obey. If, according to Piaget, they chose obedience out of fear or unilateral respect for the adult, then their responses indicate a heavy reliance on authority. In a child older than eight or nine, that type of reliance is a sign of immature notions about justice.

Four subjects over the age of nine thought that the story character should obey. In the case of ten-year-old John, it seemed clear that he chose obedience because he saw it as the only alternative for the character: "She probably cried . . . but she did it anyway." John's explanation indicated that he felt authority must prevail over justice. With Rowena and Louis, the twelve-year-old subjects, the reason for their choice of obedience was less clear. Their inability to explain why the child should obey suggested that they too felt compliance to be an inevitable fact in the face of authority. Only Miriam offered an explanation that suggested an autonomous decision based on cooperative

feelings. The findings among the older subjects are in sharp contrast to the findings of Piaget in which nearly one-hundred percent of subjects over age eleven favored equality over obedience (Piaget, 1932).

Regarding the issue of justice between children, four subjects determined that it was better for a child to enlist the aid of an adult to help him solve a problem with another child than for him to deal with the problem himself. As mentioned previously, Piaget felt that such reliance on authority was natural and developmentally appropriate in a young child but that it should not persist as the child grows older. Two subjects, Louis and Rowena, both accepted the morality of authority despite the fact that at the age of twelve they should have long since abandoned that type of thinking.

The overall pattern of responding on the issue of authority was not easy to interpret. The youngest children, Flora and Alex, were fairly authority-conscious; however, this was age-appropriate by Piagetian standards. John was somewhat reliant on authority but did show many signs of regard for equality and autonomous decision-making. Shirley and Miriam were clearly capable of rejecting the unjust use of authority.

Only Louis and Rowena showed marked delay in their attitudes about authority. Their high regard for the rule of obedience as well as their dependence on the adult for resolving matters of justice between children were attitudes

were attitudes that could not have appeared in twelve-year-olds with matured senses of justice. As with the issue of punishment, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the two twelve-year-olds once again showed gross delay in their views about one aspect of justice, the issue of authority.

4. Responsibility

The fourth parameter of justice examined was that of collective responsibility. Piaget researched this topic in hopes of finding out if, and to what extent, children advocate the practice of punishing the whole group for the offense committed by one or two of its members. He was anxious to know whether or not children saw responsibility as a collective or an individualized phenomenon.

Piaget's results were remarkably consistent. In almost all instances, the subjects interviewed rejected the idea that a group is collectively responsible for the actions of each of its members. Among the subjects interviewed for this study, the feelings elicited were identical. All seven subjects rejected the notion of collective responsibility. Story VI, which set the scene for probing attitudes about collective responsibility, involved a situation in which a teacher punished an entire group for the misdeeds of two of its members. A typical response to the teacher's reaction was one such as Louis's: "No, she should just punish the two that used the scissors."

Two variations on this theme came from John and Miriam.

John felt that the punishment was unjust but that the children should have told the teacher that one of them had not disobeyed. Miriam felt that the teacher herself should have taken responsibility for finding out the guilty parties by asking the children who had disobeyed. Despite these slight qualifications, it was clear that the subjects soundly rejected the notion of collective responsibility and, as such, revealed mature notions regarding this issue of justice.

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Discussion

Piaget talked about the existence of three major periods in the development of a child's sense of justice. These periods need to be reviewed here briefly:

Stage I: Lasting until the age of 7-8, children in this first stage view punishment as the essence of morality. Because all rules and laws come from adults, obedience to authority is considered essential. Children at this stage also have strong faith in the existence of immanent justice.

Stage II: From the ages of 7-8 to 11-12, children become more autonomous of adult authority. Stage II children value equality over all other considerations and believe that the only legitimate punishments are those based on reciprocity. Belief in immanent justice is on the decline.

Stage III: By the age of 11-12, equality is still important but it is tempered by an appreciation for the extenuating circumstances of the individual. By this age, belief in immanent justice should have disappeared entirely.

Among the subjects interviewed for the purposes of this study, some patterns of responding supported the stage findings of Piaget, while others differed considerably. Like Piaget's subjects, these children revealed increasingly reciprocal types of notions about punishment as a function of age; that is, the youngest subjects chose severe and

highly punitive types of punishments while the older subjects chose more appropriate punishments involving natural consequences.

As regards the punishment-related notion of immanent justice, there was noticeable delay among the subjects. The delay was most glaring in the responses of the twelve-year-olds. They both revealed belief in the idea that inanimate objects punish transgressors when there is no adult around to do the punishing. These findings are in sharp contrast to Piaget's. He found this notion to be almost nonexistent in children as old as twelve.

Equality was the issue on which subjects showed the highest level of development. Unlike the youngest Piagetian subjects who set the necessity for punishment above the need for equality, the youngest subjects in this study revealed a strong preference for equal treatment. This precocious understanding of equality was enhanced by an even more remarkable appreciation for the notion of equity; that is, all the subjects were able to take into consideration the extenuating circumstances of particular individuals. The tolerance and flexibility seen in this sort of thinking is generally common only to older children, not to 7-8 year olds.

The issue of authority was that which elicited the most noticeable delays in the subjects' senses of justice. In general, the subjects were able to recognize the misuse

of authority, especially when it conflicted with equality of treatment. As a group, however, they were not able to allow for challenging this misuse of authority through disobedience. Except for Shirley and Rowena, the subjects determined that obedience was the inevitable response to authority despite an obvious injustice. In contrast, Piaget found that this resigned attitude toward obedience did not exist in a normal child of ten or twelve without there being a good measure of adult restraint involved. The subjects' most popular choice of punishment, a spanking, is just such a tactic because it is based on the raw power of authority, not on the rules of mutual respect.

The subjects' generally high regard for authority was borne out by the fact that four subjects used adult figures to resolve matters of justice between children. For the two youngest subjects, this sort of reliance was age-appropriate, however, for the two twelve-year-olds it indicated a conspicuous delay. Piaget felt that with increasing age children are able to resolve conflicts between themselves by relying more and more on their solidarity with one another, and less on the dictates of adult rules and authority.

The last issue dealt with in this study, collective responsibility, produced much the same results as the studies of Piaget. The classical idea of collective responsibility involves punishing the whole group for the misdeeds of one or more of its members. Subjects universally rejected this notion. They determined that it was more just to allow a

guilty person to go unpunished than it was to punish an innocent person. The idea of collectivity, then, was completely absent from the moral make-up of these children.

In general, the findings of this study were mixed as regards lending support to Piaget's theory. The subjects involved revealed similar notions concerning collective responsibility and about some aspects of punishment as did Piagetian subjects of the same age. Conversely, they exhibited far more advanced understanding of the issue of equality. Significant delays occurred, however, in their understanding of authority and of immanent justice. On these two issues they generally fell far behind the Piagetian subjects.

Although the patterns of the delays in the childrens' senses of justice have been covered thoroughly, thusfar no effort has been made to ascribe a source or a cause to these delays. The subjects' frequent choice of spanking as the fairest punishment for a protagonist, for instance, is an immature or delayed notion if it persists in older children. The subjects in this study had their own answer to why this emphasis on spanking continued: each one, when asked what happened if someone broke a rule at school, said that the child would get spanked. Several of the subjects said that the same fate would happen to them or to their siblings if a rule at home was broken. Thus, responsibility for this delayed understanding of reciprocal punishments among the children can be laid directly at the steps

of two important institutions, the home and the school.

The subjects' restricted notions about authority, especially obedience, must be partly attributable to adult figures in their lives who demand some degree of unilateral respect. Social patterns, family customs, as well as role expectations all play a part in this phenomenon. No doubt, too, these institutions, wittingly or unwittingly, want to prepare their children for the realities of rugged Appalachian lifestyles. Perhaps they think it is kinder or more practical to instill in these young children a readiness to accept obedience to authority, even in the face of injustice, than to allow them to be disillusioned later by the prevailing injustices they encounter.

The notion of immanent justice which appeared in the thinking of the majority of subjects was a perplexing phenomenon. Piaget found that it occurred in none of his subjects over the age of 11-12. Other researchers, however, found that it often occurred among older children who lived in societies or cultures which held highly mystical or strong religious beliefs, as well as those wherein a fatalistic attitude about life prevailed. Among the subjects in this study, only one, Alex, attributed immanent justice to God. The other subjects were more animistic in their explanations; they thought the knife and the bridge "knew" that the children who used them had disobeyed and so they punished the youngsters. The prevalence, in Appalachian culture, of strong religious beliefs as well as

a certain degree of fatalism as regards one's future, may be elements of the children's learning environment that account for their inability to relinquish beliefs in immanent justice.

B. Comments on Method

Gaining access to a subject population turned out to be a far easier and more positive experience than the researcher had anticipated. Both the county superintendent of schools as well as the high-school and grade-school principals were receptive to the research project and felt hopeful that the data might provide useful feedback to them as administrators. (A summary of the findings will be shared with them.) In addition, the personal contacts with the principals and teachers proved to be warm, friendly experiences for the researcher.

The subjects themselves were also memorable personalities. Each one was an attentive listener and a willing respondent despite his/her being faced with a strange adult asking new kinds of questions, all in the odd setting of a custodial lounge. The only issue which posed any doubts for the researcher regarding the selection of subjects was that of background information. The researcher did not ask a series of specific questions regarding variables such as the economic status, religious preference, and composition of each child's family. It was felt, however, that the informal interview with the teacher provided a broad, general

picture of each child as regards these life circumstances.

The procedural steps involved in the research went smoothly on the whole. The amount of getting-acquainted time, the length of the interviews, and the spacing of the interviews all seemed to have been adequately considered factors. One aspect of the interviews --- the closing questions in which each subject talked about his opinions on such topics as cheating, telling on others, and fighting back --- proved to be a rich source of related information on the topic of children's concepts of justice. Although this information was peripheral to the major research questions, it did suggest to the researcher that future study in this area might be expanded by the use of such unstructured, direct questioning techniques.

The bulk of each interview involved the use of projective stories. As was mentioned earlier, this technique proved to be an inappropriate sort of approach with the three older high-school students. As a result, those interviews were not included in the analysis of the data.

The projective stories themselves were quite effective in eliciting the attention and responsiveness of the subjects. Although an occasional word had to be explained to the younger subjects, the content and language of the stories clearly had meaning for the children as reflected through their responses.

The projective stories also proved effective in terms of yielding information on the research questions. Because

Piaget designed the stories himself, he had a very clear idea about each of the justice-related issues they were designed to shed light on. This researcher took advantage of his extensive knowledge and found that the stories were indeed keen and abundant indicators of children's ideas about justice.

C. Implications

One fundamental precept of American education has been to instill in students an appreciation for democratic principles based on the concept of justice for the individual. Most children, especially middle and upper-class white children, are taught that they have redress to injustice through such authority figures and institutions as their parents, teachers and principals, sports referees, and, if necessary, the court system. If their experiences are positive and they feel they can count on a reasonably fair and consistent system of justice, these children will, in all likelihood, learn to value justice and to challenge injustice.

Within our system, however, exist subsystems which deprive or limit certain individuals access to just treatment. These subsystems operate in a way which discriminates on the basis of class, race, sex, and culture. Sociology suggests that the individuals involved often respond in one of two ways: overt anger and hostility turned outward, perhaps in crime, against the institutions believed to be

responsible for the injustice; or passive resignation and frustration turned inward to make for a sense of fatalism and low self-worth. Experience tells us that neither type of individual makes for an active, useful participant in a democracy.

Appalachian people, especially in the poorer and more rural locales, tend to exhibit this second response to the inequities in their lives. In many respects it is because authoritarian principles govern their lives more than democratic principles. This phenomenon has major implications as regards the development of ideas about justice among young children. If, as Piaget said, authority can only act to retard the natural development of a sense of justice, then the authoritarian institutions and systems that impinge upon Appalachian families must surely be a detractive factor in that development.

The social and cultural variables which characterize Appalachia --- a widespread sense of fatalism, strict religious beliefs, generally low economic status, and a lack of geographic and social mobility --- are not the only factors influencing the development of concepts of justice among Appalachian children. Appalachian schools, for instance, have much of the same restrictive and punitive qualities seen in metropolitan schools. Piaget once said that the major factor in the evolution of equalitarian justice is cooperation founded on mutual respect (Piaget, 1932). Because

of the highly competitive and insular nature of most public schools in Appalachia and elsewhere in the U. S., these institutions are miserable failures at the task of providing an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation among children.

Lastly, the Appalachian family itself must be looked at as a system which contributes significantly to a child's developing sense of justice. This is an enormous area for potential research. Although the family system was not the focus for this study, it might well be examined in terms of the family's life experiences with justice-related issues and encounters. If these experiences have been authority-bound and punishment-oriented then they are likely to yield restrictive notions of justice which are, sadly but expectably, passed on from one generation to the next.

VII. SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to examine concepts of justice among seven children in an Appalachian community. Research already done on the issue supported the idea that children's concepts of justice evolve in a developmental stage sequence, and subsequent research pointed to cultural and societal differences in the rate at which the sequence develops.

The researcher chose Appalachia as the location for study based upon the presence there of a number of social and cultural variables that are thought to restrict the development of a mature sense of justice. Through the use of Piagetian-type stories, the attitudes and beliefs of seven Appalachian children were gathered. Their responses were examined in two ways: (1) individually, in order to see whether or not each child's sense of justice had evolved in accord with the age findings of Piaget; (2) collectively, in order to determine similarities and differences among the children concerning beliefs about several justice-related issues.

Data on individual concepts of justice pointed to significant delays in the development of two children. Both subjects were functioning at a level of conceptualizing about justice that was far below the age findings of Piaget. Because the five other subjects revealed generally age-appropriate concepts by Piagetian standards, it cannot be said that as a group they had delayed senses

of justice. The researcher felt, however, that the delays seen in the responses of the two twelve-year-olds should be well noted because their presence indicates a decided break from the findings about the normal development of children's senses of justice.

Data on the justice-related issues revealed that the subjects varied widely in their notions about the nature and purpose of punishment; that they held equality to be more important than authority but less important than obedience; that they relied heavily on authority figures to resolve conflicts between children; and that they universally rejected the concept of collective responsibility.

In sum, the data revealed evidence for the existence of some delay in subjects' senses of justice, especially as regards the issues of authority and obedience; however, the evidence was felt to be insubstantial as regards attributing these delays entirely to the restrictive atmosphere of Appalachia. Rather, there is good reason to believe that the cultural and social variables peculiar to Appalachia combined with family and individual idiosyncracies to influence the development of concepts of justice among these children.